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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Nearly fifty years ago, the federal government of the United States of 
America passed into law the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in order to promote the 
protection of constitutional rights and provide relief against discrimination.1  
Twenty-five years later, in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court 
established a burden-shifting framework that allowed an employer to defend 
particular actions that may have involved discrimination in Title VII claims.2  
Congress addressed the Court’s burden-shifting framework two years later in 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, by specifically identifying a restriction against 
mixed-motive discrimination3 and the resultant responsibility of an employer 
to defend such questionable employment practices.4 
 In University of Texas Southwest Medical Center v. Nassar, the 
Supreme Court addressed the applicability of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to 
activities relating to the facilitation of anti-discrimination enforcement.5  This 
case is important because it creates a higher burden of proof for a plaintiff in 
a Title VII retaliation case.6 
 This Note will argue that the Supreme Court’s holding in Nassar 
misinterpreted the legislative action implemented in the Civil Rights Act of 
1991 in order to adopt the but-for causation standard supported in the 
dissenting opinion from Price Waterhouse.  This interpretation imposes the 
burden upon a plaintiff of establishing but-for causation regarding the 
discriminatory motives of an employer in Title VII retaliation claims.7  
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1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 241 (1964). 
2. 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989). 
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2013). 
4. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 
5. 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2528–31 (2013). 
6. Id. at 2533. 
7. Id. 
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Additionally, the Supreme Court inappropriately based its deviation from the 
Price Waterhouse precedent on the similarity among provisions of Title VII 
and the unrelated Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA),8 
despite previously recognizing the clear intentions of Congress to treat the 
statutory schemes in a different manner.9 
 The resultant framework of the Nassar decision creates a paradoxical 
employment environment regarding discrimination.  Previous legislation and 
court rulings served to protect employees from mixed-motive adverse 
employment decisions up to the point of making a discrimination complaint, 
while the Nassar decision, based on precedent related to a separate statutory 
scheme, cuts that protection short and insulates an employer from liability 
for actions after an employee initially complains.10 
II.  BACKGROUND 
In order to fully appreciate the impact of Nassar on Title VII claims, it 
is necessary to examine the decision in Price Waterhouse that established a 
burden-shifting framework and the subsequent legislation in the aftermath of 
that case.  Additionally, the decision in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, 
Inc.11 is important to understand the path deviating the Court away from 
Price Waterhouse and the basis for the Nassar decision. 
This Note will first examine the decision in Price Waterhouse and its 
impact on Title VII discrimination claims.  Then, this Note will examine the 
codification of Price Waterhouse in the Civil Right Act of 1991.  Next, this 
Note will discuss the Court’s decision in Gross, when the Court deviated 
from the Price Waterhouse burden-shifting framework for ADEA claims.  
Finally, this Note will examine how the Court used Gross to extend the 
ADEA framework back to Title VII retaliation claims in Nassar. 
A.  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins 
In Price Waterhouse, the plaintiff, Ms. Hopkins brought a Title VII sex 
discrimination suit against her employers alleging that she was denied 
partnership in the Price Waterhouse accounting firm based on the 
partnership’s use of gender stereotypes in its promotional decisions.12  Ms. 
Hopkins was a senior manager and a candidate for partnership at Price 
Waterhouse.13  She had worked at Price Waterhouse for five years and was 
                                                                                                                                      
8. Id. at 2526–27. 
9. Id. at 2527. 
10. Id. at 2533–34. 
11. 557 U.S. 167 (2009). 
12. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 231–32 (1989). 
13. Id. at 232. 
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instrumental in acquiring a contract in excess of twenty-five million dollars 
with the Department of State.14 
Despite Ms. Hopkins’s qualifications, the record demonstrated that 
there were issues with her “interpersonal skills.”15  However, it was also clear 
that Ms. Hopkins did not fulfill the gender role that some members of the 
partnership expected of her.16  Expectations of lady-like behavior were 
evident, and the record indicated some members of the partnership even 
advised her to correct her unfeminine behavior.17  Additionally, at least one 
member of the partnership had a history of discrimination against female 
candidates for partnership, and the other members had taken no action to 
correct his behavior.18  This member was even allowed to continue 
submitting his opinion on further candidates.19 
The lower court found there to be both legitimate and discriminatory 
issues involved in the evaluation of Ms. Hopkins’s candidacy for partnership, 
and it held Price Waterhouse was liable for its behavior.20  It also held that 
Price Waterhouse could have defeated liability for equitable relief if it had 
shown by clear and convincing evidence that it would have come to the same 
decision even if the discriminatory motivation was removed from its 
decision.21  However, as the decision against Ms. Hopkins’s promotion was 
clouded with so many indications of discriminatory motives, Price 
Waterhouse could not demonstrate a motivation that was sufficiently 
independent of discrimination.22 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the requisite burden of 
proof for the plaintiff and the defendant in a Title VII suit.23  A major dividing 
line in the Court’s decision related to whether the statutory scheme 
necessitated but-for causation in order for a plaintiff to prevail.  Where the 
plurality came together was on the agreement that the burden of proof for a 
defendant was by a preponderance of the evidence, as opposed to clear and 
convincing evidence.24 
The majority opinion of the Court identified that, in other incidents 
where clear and convincing evidence is necessary, it is required of a plaintiff 
and acts as a protection for a defendant.25  An exception to this, and another 
instance requiring clear and convincing evidence, was in the situation where 
                                                                                                                                      
14. Id. at 233–34. 
15. Id. at 234–35. 
16. Id. at 235. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. at 236. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. at 236–37. 
21. Id. at 237. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. at 232. 
24. Id. at 258. 
25. Id. at 253. 
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a federal agency wished to show a plaintiff in a Title VII claim was not 
entitled to relief.26  The Court differentiated that instance from the facts of 
Price Waterhouse, as the prior case involved a situation related to damages 
after initial liability was determined, and the case at hand dealt with the initial 
determination of liability.27 
Justice O’Connor made the argument in her concurring opinion that a 
burden-shifting framework is common in a number of judicial areas, as there 
is only a certain extent to which a plaintiff can go in establishing a prima 
facie case.28  In the setting of a Title VII claim, after an employee has 
demonstrated a prima facie case, it is appropriate for the burden to shift to 
the defendant, because there is no longer a good faith presumption.29  The 
situation would not exist absent the employer’s allowance of discriminatory 
motives intermingled with legitimate motives.30 
On the issue of but-for causation, the majority opinion addressed the 
paradoxical burden the dissent would impose on a plaintiff in a Title VII 
claim involving mixed-motives.31  Basically, if two forces are at play, and it 
is unknown whether one or both of the forces is the but-for cause, 
determining the but-for cause would not be possible.32  It cannot be the case 
that there is no cause.33   
In the concurrence, Justice O’Connor did not agree on the metaphysical 
contemplations, but instead advocated a position that deemed a higher burden 
of proof for the plaintiff as unreasonable for practical standards of 
accessibility to the facts.34  A plaintiff can only show that discrimination was 
involved to a substantial degree but cannot “pinpoint discrimination as the 
precise cause of her injury.”35 
The dissent took a position favoring strict but-for causation.36  The 
dissent believed that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was “not concerned with 
the mere presence of impermissible motives.”37  Rather, the Act is only 
“directed to employment decisions that result from these motives.”38 
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
26. Id. at 253–54. 
27. Id. at 254. 
28. Id. at 263–64 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
29. Id. at 265–66. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 240–41 (majority opinion). 
32. Id. at 241. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 272 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
35. Id. at 273. 
36. Id. at 281–82 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
37. Id. at 282. 
38. Id. 
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B.  Civil Rights Act of 1991 
Two years after the Price Waterhouse decision, Congress passed the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991 in order to, among other things, “respond to recent 
decisions by the Supreme Court” and to “provide adequate protection to 
victims of discrimination.”39  The law added §§ 2000e-2(m) and 2000e-
5(b)(2).40  In § 2000e-2(m), the law codified the restriction against mixed-
motive discrimination actions by employers.41  In § 2000e-5(b)(2), the law 
codified the effects of the burden-shifting framework, placing the burden on 
the defendant after the plaintiff establishes an initial prima facie case.42 
C.  Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. 
In Gross, the fifty-four-year-old plaintiff alleged age discrimination 
after his employer reallocated his duties partially to another employee in her 
early forties.43  The plaintiff filed suit, alleging violations of the ADEA.44 
The plaintiff prevailed in the district court, but the decision was 
appealed based on a questionable jury instruction related to the requisite 
burden of proof.45  The district court required only a showing by a 
preponderance of the evidence that discrimination was a motivating factor in 
the employment decision before the burden shifted to the defendant, but on 
appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the burden-
shifting framework from Price Waterhouse controlled ADEA claims.46  
Under that framework, the plaintiff must show direct evidence of 
discrimination, as opposed to a showing by a preponderance of the evidence, 
before the burden shifts to the defendant.47 
The Supreme Court overturned the circuit court, ruling that Price 
Waterhouse was not controlling on ADEA claims.48  The Court identified 
ADEA claims and Title VII claims as controlled by different statutory 
schemes and necessarily subject to different rules.49 
The Court went on to note that Congress did not similarly amend the 
ADEA after the Price Waterhouse decision as it had amended Title VII 
through the Civil Rights Act of 1991.50  The Court equated this legislative 
                                                                                                                                      
39. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, § 3 (1991). 
40. Id. § 107. 
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2013). 
42. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 
43. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 170 (2009). 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 170–71. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 171–72. 
48. Id. at 173–74. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 174–75. 
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inaction as an intention to exclude ADEA claims from the Price Waterhouse 
burden-shifting framework.51 
Absent the applicability of Price Waterhouse, the Court looked to the 
ADEA to provide a standard that could defeat the Court’s presumptive 
application of but-for causation.52  The Court held that no such provision was 
present, and ruled that “the plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion to 
establish . . . the ‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s adverse action.”53 
III.  EXPOSITION OF THE CASE 
In University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, the 
Supreme Court saw another Title VII case involving mixed-motives, but this 
time in the form of a discrimination-based retaliation claim.54  The Court 
came to a different decision in Nassar than it did in Price Waterhouse.55  The 
Court adopted the but-for requirement present in the Price Waterhouse 
dissent and later in the Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. ADEA case.56 
A.  Facts and Procedural Posture 
The plaintiff, Dr. Naiel Nassar, was a faculty member of middle-eastern 
descent at the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center (UTSW) 
from 1995-2006 (except for a brief time when he pursued further 
education).57  He was also a physician with Parkland Hospital due to an 
affiliation between the university and the hospital.58  The affiliation required 
Parkland Hospital “to offer empty staff physician posts to the University’s 
faculty members . . . and, accordingly, most of the staff physician positions 
at the [h]ospital [we]re filled by those faculty members.”59 
In 2004, UTSW hired Dr. Beth Levine who became Dr. Nassar’s 
supervisor.60  Witnesses claim Levine made racist comments, calling middle-
easterners lazy, opposing the hiring of middle-easterners, and complaining 
when middle-easterners were hired.61  Additionally, it was alleged that she 
                                                                                                                                      
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 175–76. 
53. Id. at 177. 
54. 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2522–23 (2013). 
55. Id. at 2534. 
56. Id. at 2523. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 2523, 2536. 
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unduly scrutinized the work of Dr. Nassar.62  Dr. Nassar filed complaints with 
Levine’s supervisor, Dr. Gregory Fitz, but Dr. Fitz failed to take any action.63 
After preliminary negotiations to stay on with Parkland Hospital, Dr. 
Nassar resigned from his position at UTSW and sent a letter to multiple 
recipients explaining his decision was based on the harassment from 
Levine.64  In response to the letter, a witness heard Fitz state that it was 
publicly humiliating for Levine and that she should be “publicly 
exonerated.”65 
Fitz made it known he opposed Parkland Hospital’s decision to hire Dr. 
Nassar, and soon after, Parkland Hospital withdrew from employment 
negotiations.66  After the withdrawal, Dr. Nassar filed a Title VII suit in the 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, alleging religious and 
racially-motivated harassment resulting in his constructive discharge.67  He 
filed a second claim under § 2000e-3(a), alleging that the efforts to prevent 
his employment with the hospital were retaliatory actions in response to his 
complaints about harassment.68 
Dr. Nassar prevailed in the District Court, which awarded $400,000 in 
back-pay and $300,000 in compensatory damages.69  However, the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the discrimination verdict and left the 
judgment for retaliatory discharge intact.70  Certiorari was granted in order to 
determine the appropriate standard of causation for retaliation claims under 
Title VII.71 
B.  Majority Opinion 
There are four main points set out in the majority opinion.  The first 
deals with the effect of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).72  The second argument 
equates the word “because” with “but-for” causation.73  The third argument 
is an efficiency-based argument, stating that without but-for causation, it is 
too difficult to weed out frivolous claims at an early stage.74  The fourth 
                                                                                                                                      
62. Id. at 2523. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 2523–24. 
65. Id. at 2524. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 2528–31. 
73. Id. at 2526–27. 
74. Id. at 2531–32. 
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argument simply explains why the Court should not give deference to the 
EEOC.75 
The first argument of the majority opinion identifies the language of 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) as the source of a lessened burden of proof.76  Congress 
added this section in response to the decision in Price Waterhouse to clarify 
its intention.77  However, the placement and wording of the provision 
seemingly does not relate to retaliation, in the Court’s opinion, because 
specific types of discrimination are listed after the identification of the 
lessened standard of proof, and retaliation claims are not included in the list.78 
The second argument simply looks to precedent regarding the word 
“because.”79  The Court held that if something happens “because of” another 
thing, then that other thing is the “reason” for it.80  Therefore, that other thing 
is the “but-for” cause.81  This argument existed in the dissent of Price 
Waterhouse,82 and reappeared in Gross (relating to the ADEA),83 and the 
Court found it instructive in Nassar.84 
The third argument discusses the inefficiency that would arise out of a 
lessened burden of proof for retaliation charges.85  The Court found that 
retaliation charges filed with the EEOC have the second highest 
discrimination claim rate after those based on race.86  The Court stated that 
ensuring a higher burden of proof would help the court system free up 
resources and dismiss frivolous claims earlier in the litigation process.87 
The final argument identifies the EEOC guidelines as undeserving of 
deference.88  The standard set out in Skidmore v. Swift states deference to an 
agency depends on “the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the 
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later 
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade.”89  In 
the end, the criticism is that the agency failed to address specific details and 
the agency’s discussion is far too generic to provide any forceful 
persuasion.90 
                                                                                                                                      
75. Id. at 2533–34. 
76. Id. at 2526. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 2528. 
79. Id. at 2527. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 281–82 (1989).  
83. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176–77 (2009). 
84. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2523. 
85. Id. at 2531. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 2531–32. 
88. Id. at 2533. 
89. Id. (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). 
90. Id. 
2015]  Casenote 565 
 
 
C.  Dissenting Opinion 
The dissent addressed each of the majority’s arguments in turn.  In 
regard to the majority’s argument about legislative intent and the placement 
of § 2000e-2(m), the dissent pointed out the majority’s willful disregard for 
the House Report for 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).91  Congress’s intent was to 
lessen the burden of proof and to ensure the recognition of discrimination as 
unlawful, even in a case in which it is only one of the motivating factors in 
an adverse employment action.92  Congress was trying to strengthen the law 
against discrimination, and it would make little sense if its action was 
interpreted to be limited only to specific acts, while weakening the law in 
regard to retaliation.93 
The dissent also argued that retaliation is in fact a type of discrimination 
that is listed in the affected parts of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).94  Although it 
may not be listed specifically, when someone is retaliated against after filing 
a complaint for racial discrimination, any retaliation on that individual is a 
manifestation of racial discrimination.95 
 Additionally, the dissent identified the EEOC’s immediate reference to 
the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).96  The fact that retaliation was not 
specifically listed as being subject to the lessened burden of proof did not 
change the way that retaliation claims had always been handled.97  The failure 
to list retaliation in the provision would not mean that a type of discrimination 
would go unpunished.98 
 The dissent also identified the meaning of “because” in the context of a 
mixed-motive decision, just as the majority held in Price Waterhouse.99 
III.  ANALYSIS 
The majority decision in Nassar, allowing mixed-motives in retaliatory 
employment actions, was inappropriate.  Part A of this Section discusses why 
Nassar should have been decided differently, based on precedent, legislative 
history, policy, and statutory provisions.  Part B discusses the implications 
of the Nassar decision in creating inconsistencies and an impractical 
framework for Title VII claims. 
                                                                                                                                      
91. Id. at 2537 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. at 2539. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 2540. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 2546. 
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A.  The Decision in Nassar Was Inappropriate Because It Ignored Title VII 
History 
Price Waterhouse controlled status-based Title VII discrimination and 
retaliation claims in the time between the Court’s decision in that case and 
Nassar,100 and prior to Gross, the Price Waterhouse framework was even 
extended to discrimination claims under other statutory schemes.101  The 
Civil Rights Act of 1991 codified the ruling in Price Waterhouse by 
expressly restricting status-based adverse employment practices.102  The 
Price Waterhouse decision’s major contribution to discrimination suits was 
the causation analysis it provided. 
In Gross, the Court avoided applying the same causation to ADEA 
claims as Price Waterhouse, because ADEA claims and Title VII claims are 
governed by different statutory schemes.103  However, the Court’s opinion in 
Nassar, authored and joined by the same Justices as in Gross, avoided the 
causation framework from Price Waterhouse and instead compared the 
“because” language in Title VII to the “because” language in the ADEA.104 
In the first instance, the Court refused to compare similar language 
because of different statutory schemes,105 while in the second instance the 
Court refused to differentiate statutory schemes because of similar 
language.106  One would generally call similar methods of justification 
circular, but circularity is, in the very least, redeemable through its internal 
logical consistency.  In this case, the Court is only consistent in its selective 
adoption of contradictory arguments to achieve a discernible goal. 
When the Court ruled in Price Waterhouse, there was relative clarity 
regarding the meaning of “because” in Title VII.107  The legislature 
subsequently codified restrictions against mixed-motive employment 
actions,108 but the Court in Nassar held that the placement of the provisions 
and the wording indicated that the restriction did not apply to Title VII 
retaliation claims.109  However, to accept that the definition of “because” 
found in other sections of Title VII somehow lacks a clear definition after 
Price Waterhouse would be to limit the effect of a Supreme Court ruling to 
the narrowest scope.  If the definition ascribed to “because” in Price 
Waterhouse was so limited to the point that it was inapplicable even to other 
                                                                                                                                      
100. Id. at 2545. 
101. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 172 (2009). 
102. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2526. 
103. Gross, 557 U.S. at 174. 
104. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2528. 
105. Gross, 557 U.S. at 174. 
106. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2528. 
107. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240–42 (1989). 
108. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2526. 
109. Id. at 2528. 
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appearances in the same statutory scheme, then the power of the Supreme 
Court, and its ability to provide meaningful guidance to lower courts, is 
diminished.  Furthermore, if the Nassar Court adopted this understanding of 
the applicability of the Price Waterhouse Court’s ruling, it would have 
simultaneously accepted such a neutered force and effect of its own ruling. 
On the other hand, if the Nassar Court accepted the applicability of the 
Price Waterhouse Court’s definition, at least extending it to other 
appearances in the same statutory scheme, then the Nassar Court was 
overturning the previous decision in its ruling by expressly substituting a new 
causation framework.  The Court attempted to sidestep the issue of overruling 
Price Waterhouse by noting that the codification of Price Waterhouse in the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991 was a deliberate action that meant to exclude all 
sections apart from the status-based discrimination section.110 
It seems the Court was trying to indicate that the legislature was 
impliedly limiting the effect of Price Waterhouse to these status-based 
claims, but the Court also identified those legislative actions as “reject[ing] 
it to a substantial degree.”111  The conclusion the Court comes to in this 
instance is counterintuitive once again, because if the Court accepted the 
applicability of the Price Waterhouse Court’s definition in the very least 
across the same statute, then the Court should have necessarily viewed the 
legislature’s action as reinforcing the causation framework without 
restriction in other areas of the same statutory scheme. 
If the legislature only limited aspects of the Price Waterhouse ruling in 
its codification, under the same legislative intent analysis advocated by the 
Nassar Court, it would imply that the legislature intentionally remained silent 
only in limiting the causation framework in the remainder of the statutory 
scheme. 
Clearly, the Price Waterhouse decision controlled questions of 
causation under Title VII after the decision.112  If the legislature passed laws 
that expressly codified the Price Waterhouse causation framework for status-
based discrimination under Title VII, but did not expressly extend that 
framework to other areas of Title VII, then the silence on those other areas 
should not constitute a legislative reversal of a Supreme Court ruling.  
However, if the legislature codified certain aspects of the Price Waterhouse 
ruling and expressly limited aspects of it in relation to status-based 
discrimination under Title VII, but remained silent regarding these 
limitations for other adverse employment actions under Title VII, then the 
silence on those other areas should constitute an intention to maintain the 
unfettered applicability of the Price Waterhouse ruling for those other areas. 
                                                                                                                                      
110. Id. at 2529. 
111. Id. at 2526. 
112. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 172 (2009). 
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So it appears the Nassar Court must accept either the limited scope of 
the force and effect behind its own decision or it must recognize that its 
decision overturned the ruling in Price Waterhouse, which the legislature 
expressly approved in relation to status-based claims and impliedly in 
relation to all other Title VII claims, in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 
B.  The Decision in Nassar Created an Impractical Framework for Title VII 
Claims 
In Gross, the Court characterized the causation and burden-shifting 
framework from Price Waterhouse as difficult to apply.113  But, in adopting 
a different causation framework for Title VII retaliation claims, while the 
statutorily mandated burden-shifting framework for status-based claims 
remains in effect, the resultant guidance for lower courts is now anything but 
practical.114  The consequences are even more visible in the context of a 
mixed claim under Title VII, which includes both a status based claim and a 
retaliation claim.115  Furthermore, the different causation frameworks 
effectively create a caveat for the protections provided under Title VII, and a 
disincentive now exists for participating in any of the actions protected from 
retaliation. 
In Gross, the Court discussed the difficulty in providing clear 
instructions to juries in the context of a burden-shifting framework.116  The 
difficulties have often led to judgments notwithstanding the verdict when the 
jury did not apply the framework properly.117  In that case, the Court chose 
to go a different route in order to avoid the identified problems in ADEA 
claims.118 
However, in Nassar, the Court’s decision to avoid the burden-shifting 
framework for one type of claim under Title VII, while it remains applicable 
to status-based claims under the same statutory scheme, “is a complicated 
concept to convey to juries” and it “is virtually certain to sow confusion.”119  
This is most clear in the context of a Title VII claim consisting of both status-
based discrimination claims and retaliation claims.120 
On the status-based portion of a combined Title VII claim, the plaintiff 
would need to show direct evidence of discrimination, and then the employer 
would need to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
employment decision would have been made regardless of improper 
                                                                                                                                      
113. Id. at 179. 
114. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2546. 
115. Id. 
116. Gross, 557 U.S. at 179. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2546. 
120. Id. 
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motives.121  But on the retaliation portion of the claim, the plaintiff would 
need to demonstrate that the adverse action would not have happened at all 
in the absence of improper motives stemming from the plaintiff’s protected 
actions.122 
Once again, the majority in Gross based its decision on a policy 
argument,123 and the majority in Nassar, consisting of the same Justices, 
contradicted the previously adopted policy in its decision.124  Favoring 
uniform applications across a statutory scheme is either appropriate or not.  
However, the inconsistent behavior of the Court in promoting this concept in 
an erratic fashion is certainly inappropriate. 
The interdependence of anti-discrimination statutes and anti-retaliation 
statutes is a fundamental relationship that is inherently necessary in order to 
effectuate the underlying purpose of promoting equality.125  Enforcement of 
anti-discrimination laws is only possible if individuals are free to participate 
in the actions that bring discrimination to light, without the threat of 
retaliation looming overhead.126  And additionally, the two claims are 
frequently brought in the same action.127 
The difference in causation frameworks causes a lack of protection for 
employees in certain circumstances, and it also creates an uncertainty and 
disincentive for involvement in the protected actions under the anti-
retaliation provisions. 
With a higher burden of proof for plaintiffs in retaliation claims under 
Title VII, it is conceivable that an individual may prevail, at least in part, on 
a status-based claim and fail on a retaliation claim, even when both actions 
are based on the same discrimination-based motivations.  Additionally, other 
employees, possessing knowledge of relevant details, may be dissuaded from 
assisting in coworkers’ claims, understanding Nassar diminished their 
protection. 
Without the same level of protection for retaliation claims, participants 
in status-based discrimination claims or investigations could be subjected to 
adverse actions, and those participants would have a higher burden of proof 
in establishing a claim than the original plaintiff, whom they attempted to 
assist.  In this way, an employee’s recourse would be restricted in multiple 
ways.  It would be restricted by the increased burden of proof in that 
employee’s own Title VII retaliation claim, and by the dissuasion of other 
coworkers to participate in Title VII claims for fear of retaliation. 
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Another undesirable consequence is found in the case at hand.  Dr. 
Nassar complained of discrimination, and instead of filing a claim, he opted 
to remove himself from the situation.128  When the defendant responded 
through retaliatory actions, Dr. Nassar filed a claim.129  Prior to the decision 
in Nassar, Dr. Nassar would have been equally protected, with the same 
burden of proof in filing a claim for status-based discrimination or 
retaliation.130  In the aftermath, a plaintiff loses protection upon making a 
complaint and removing himself from a hostile environment.131 
The Court argued that a heightened burden of proof could minimize 
frivolous lawsuits based on workplace harassment.132  But, the case at hand 
indicates a different incentive structure.  The Court’s decision does not 
promote peaceable separation in situations of workplace discrimination.  
Instead, an employee is better off filing a status-based discrimination claim 
under Title VII with a lessened burden of proof than leaving the place of 
employment, crossing his fingers, and hoping adverse actions will not follow 
him. 
Incentivizing status-based claims in comparison to retaliation claims 
should prove to provide contradictory results to the predictions of the 
Court.133  Fewer people will leave hostile environments peaceably without 
seeking legal protection.  Knowing the Nassar decision minimizes retaliation 
protections, the victims of discrimination will be more likely to file timely 
claims, before adverse retaliation actions stemming from workplace 
discrimination complaints cloud the issues.  Alternatively, and equally 
undesirable, is the possibility employees will remain in hostile environments 
without complaining of discrimination, waiting for the discrimination to 
manifest in an adverse employment action. 
The resultant statutory scheme under Nassar indicates a caveat of 
protection exists.  An employer is restricted from taking adverse employment 
actions involving a combination of legitimate motives and illegitimate status-
based discriminatory motives, unless the employer can show the action 
would have occurred in the absence of the illegitimate motives.134  However, 
an employer is restricted from taking retaliatory adverse employment actions 
only in situations where the employer has no other motivations for the 
adverse action.135  This means discriminatory motives may play a major role 
in a retaliatory, adverse employment action, as long as there are other 
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motivations involved.136  Or, in other words, if multiple forces exist, each 
being sufficient to cause a result, one cannot identify a but-for cause.137 
However as the scenario is characterized, it does not sit well to 
formulate potential situations in which Nassar’s resultant framework will 
affect victims of discrimination.  Where the line is cloudy between legitimate 
and illegitimate motives, it is inappropriate to demand a victim reach into the 
mind of his tormentor, and weigh the effect of an intangible factor to which 
he does not have unfettered access. 
At the point when a plaintiff has demonstrated an evidentiary basis for 
a Title VII claim, that plaintiff “ha[s] taken [the] proof as far as it could 
go.”138  To allow a defendant to defeat that proof by merely presenting a 
facially valid, potential alternative motivation would be equivalent to 
denying the very purpose of Title VII.139  This is especially true in situations 
where the other party has substantially disproportionate access to the facts.140 
In essence, the Court’s decision in Nassar serves to complicate the 
resolution of Title VII claims containing both status-based and retaliation 
claims.  It also diminishes the protections provided by Title VII, and in so 
doing, the decision is likely to result in more status-based discrimination 
claims under Title VII, as any employee experiencing discrimination is better 
served filing a claim prior to retaliatory actions, because peaceable 
separations effectively expose employees to vulnerabilities. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
When the Court decided Nassar, it applied the reasoning from Gross, 
and it did so according to an analysis it rejected in Gross.  The Court also 
relied on faulty logic in its interpretation of the legislative intent behind the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991.  The resulting causation framework it decided to 
apply to retaliation claims under Title VII undermines the fundamental 
purpose of protecting employees from discrimination.  Even in a vacuum, the 
decision would have compromised protections from discrimination, but 
considering the precedent, the existing statutory framework for status-based 
discrimination claims under Title VII, and the inevitable confusion the 
decision will produce in mixed-claim jury instructions, the decision was 
inappropriate. 
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